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Summary. The recent Mirai botnet attack demonstrated the danger of
using default passwords and showed it is still a major problem in 2017. In
this study we investigated several common applications and their pass-
word policies. Specifically, we analyzed if these applications: (1) have
default passwords or (2) allow the user to set a weak password (i.e.,
they do not properly enforce a password policy). In order to understand
the developer decision to implement default passwords, we raised this
question on many online platforms or contacted professionals. Default
passwords are still a significant problem. 61% of applications inspected
initially used a default or blank password. When changing the password,
58% allowed a blank password, 35% allowed a weak password of 1 char-
acter.
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1 Introduction
Security is often disregarded or perceived as optional to the average consumer
which can be a drawback. For instance, in October 2016 a large section of the In-
ternet came under attack. This attack was perpetuated by approximately 100,000
Internet of Things (IoT) appliances, refrigerators, and microwaves which were
compromised and formed the Mirai botnet. Targets of this attack included Twit-
ter, reddit and The New York Times all of which shut down for hours. The Mirai
botnet was created by abusing default credentials in IoT devices [16, 33].
Besides devices, there are also many applications permitting users access to
critical central resources such as Database Management Systems (DBMS), Web
Server Applications, and Content Management Systems (CMS) which are com-
monly secured by a username and password. For instance, in July 2014 hackers
attacked HealthCare.gov [37]. Fifteen days later HealthCare.gov released a state-
ment that only the test servers were hacked and no personal information was
compromised. The attack occurred because the manufacturer’s default password
on the server had not been changed. This attack was successful because server
administrators had neglected this basic security risk. Days later, despite report-
ing on this vulnerability, the default password had still not been updated [5].
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It became imperative to investigate further security vulnerabilities from default
passwords. Although in the prior example only a test environment was com-
promised, commonly test environments go live at some point and during that
transition default passwords are often left unchanged.
These findings motivated us to perform two short surveys with the goal to
start a discussion in the field about the usage of develop passwords: The first was
to examine applications such as DBMS, Web Server Applications, and CMSs
that enable a default password during initial configuration. Results show the
most applications have default credentials. The second survey was conducted
on developers to understand the use of default passwords. The results indicate
that many services are designed with default passwords to bypass authentication
to provide immediate, temporary access for quick, convenient initial set up of
infrastructure and should only be used during this installation phase.
Remark: A short version of this article was published at International Confer-
ence on Digital Forensics & Cyber Crime 2017 which published the proceedings
in Springer LNICST. If you use this article for your research, please cite the
published version.
2 Literature review
“Passwords are an ubiquitous and critical component of many security systems”
[38]. Despite the increasing use of biometrics, passwords remain the most com-
mon authentication mechanism. Therefore, it is important to create secure pass-
words that are difficult to compromise. Furthermore, a common theme within
information security is that users are the biggest security threat; users can often
be careless and fail to prevent fundamental security concerns. As a consequence,
administrators often force users to follow password policies. For instance, accord-
ing to [20], a strong password policy requires a minimum number of characters,
different types of characters, and specify how frequently users should change
their passwords.
However, [2] found that users may “compromise computer security mech-
anisms, such as password authentication, both knowing and unknowingly, [...
but] such behavior is often caused by the way in which security mechanisms are
implemented, and users’ lack of knowledge”. A result of their survey was that
complex policies often force users to write down their passwords, as they can-
not memorize them, which creates an additional security concern. This coincides
with the findings from [31].
As a consequence, researchers developed additional extensions to enhance
password policies. One recommendation is to involve an interface Human-
Computer Interaction that observes how humans interact with devices and ma-
chines. For instance, [17] concludes that “rather than focusing on password poli-
cies on maximizing password strength and enforcing frequency alone, policies
should be designed using HCI principles to help the user to set an appropriately
strong password in a specific context of use”. Another idea is to utilize user’s
“typing patterns (e.g., duration of keystrokes, and latencies between keystrokes)
An Overview of the Usage of Default Passwords (extended version) 3
are combined with the user’s password to generate a hardened password” [22].
Practical examples of this include measuring whether or not the user is not only
using the appropriate password, but entering it as the expected user should be.
I.e., if the user typically enters their password at 140 words per minute, but the
entry this time was only 100 words per minute, the user may not be who we
expect them to be.
More recently, changes to the National Institutes of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) Digital Authentication Guidelines have suggestions for improving
security and reduce common issues [15]. These suggestions can be broken down
into several main categories: hashing passwords, increasing user friendliness, en-
forcing an 8-character minimum, and banning common passwords. It suggests
avoiding password rules, password hints, security questions, and never forcing
arbitrary password changes [43]. These suggestions are a step in the right direc-
tion for new password policy, though despite being nearly a year old, have yet
to be implemented by many application developers.
In the following, the focus will turn exclusively to default passwords. There is
additional literature about the aforementioned topics but they are not the main
focus of this article.
2.1 Reasons for Default Passwords
Despite widespread use there was little literature on the reasoning for use of
default passwords. One argument we found that advocates the use of default
passwords was in the field of automation, in a testimony from [39] who states
that it is often motivated by vendors with easy remote access and “plant staff is
reluctant to change default passwords because of personnel performance consid-
erations during emergency events”. Another reason was mentioned by [13] who
points out that a benefit of default configurations is ease of usage – “this does
make it easier to install new products”. However, both references red-flag the us-
age of default passwords. Following the installation, many are not changed. This
is supported by [12], in that users enjoy the convenience of default credentials
and are often ignorant on matters of information security.
A justification for using default passwords was asserted by Verifone, a com-
pany for electronic payment transactions: “The purpose of this default password
is to simply initiate terminal installation, and it is not intended to serve as a
strong security control. The important fact to point out is that even knowing
this password, sensitive payment information or PII cannot be captured. To
date, Verifone has not witnessed any attacks on the security of its terminals
based on default passwords. What the password allows someone to do is to con-
figure some settings on the terminal; all executables have to be file signed, and it
is not possible to enter malware just by knowing passwords” [10]. However, this
statement was released after researchers found the default password of a credit
card terminal and published a report about their findings. The report claims
Verifone used the same default password for two decades [42].
In summary, there is no substantial, convincing argument that justifies the
usage of default passwords. Convenience is often cited but does not provide any
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form of security. Therefore, it is does not justify use. In fact, the phrase “default
password” may as well be an oxymoron; the latter insinuates that it is, at least
in part, secure, and this is not the case. Most references attempted to find a
good reason for using a default password but subsequently referred to them as a
vulnerability and poor practice. Vendors that do not see security concerns as a
problem with their product are jeopardizing the safety of their customers. They
should know, more than most, that the average consumer likely needs additional
help, and they should provide this additional service.
2.2 Breaches Exploiting Default User Credentials
Although guidelines and warnings regarding default passwords exist, there are
still many incidents involving default credentials. According to [7], “very few
open source vendor advisories have mentioned default passwords, whereas they
appear with some regularity in closed source advisories, even in the top 10 [vul-
nerabilities] as recently as 2005”.
A newer study named the Verizon Data Breach Report examined 621 corpo-
rate breaches. “The analysis found that 78% of initial intrusions into corporate
networks were elementary. Many attackers use a phishing attack, convincing em-
ployees to give up credentials, or brute force attack, taking advantage of weak
or default passwords on remote services to gain initial access to the network”
[40]. Unfortunately, the report did not mention, out of 78% how many consti-
tuted weak passwords or default passwords. Notwithstanding, some of the recent
breaches that were attributed to the misuse of default passwords:
Utah Department of Health suffered a breach of 780k Medicaid patient
health records [27] in addition to compromising more than 255,000 social
security numbers [36]. Attackers achieved complete access to the system us-
ing a default password.
A Bank of Montreal’s ATM was hacked by two 14 year old children; they
used the machine’s default password [25]. They were able to:
1. Find out how much money was available in the ATM.
2. Change the surcharge amount to one cent.
3. Change the ATM’s greeting to “Go Away, this ATM has been hacked”.
U.S. Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment used to broadcast warn-
ings was hacked by exploiting default passwords. After the breach, the hack-
ers sent out an alert warning the public of a ‘zombie attack’ [25].
Electronic Highway Billboards were attacked in June 2014. The hacker
changed the signs to display their Twitter/hacker handle for all the highway
drivers to see. This was an act of mischief reported by [18]. According to
[23], “the vulnerability is a hard-coded password that could allow unautho-
rized access to the highway sign, DHS officials said in an alert on Wednes-
day. Hard-coded passwords, sometimes called back doors, are default logins
that software developers code into their programs. The vulnerability was
identified in Daktronics Vanguard highway notification sign configuration
software”.
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A recent WordPress incident demonstrated that the usage of a default user-
name can result in a tremendous security risk. In case of WordPress, the default
username is always ‘admin’. Hackers used that knowledge and used a botnet to
brute force 90,000 IP addresses hosting different software [4]. Unfortunately, the
report did not release how successful this attack was.
2.3 Taking advantage of default passwords - tools, scripts and
malware
Attackers, often taking an opportunistic approach, realized the potential in abus-
ing default passwords to access a system. Thus, there are several tools, scripts,
and malware that can be used for this purpose.
The default password of a given software or product may be easily found
online. Furthermore, one can find complete lists of common default passwords;
many of which are included in password tool distributions. [35] states “the most
common password lists found using Internet search engines were default pass-
word lists. These lists contain passwords used by hardware manufacturers as
the default security setting”. These lists were, and still are employed by pro-
grammers and hackers that use default password scanning tools and worms. [6]
mentioned several tools that focus on exploiting default passwords. For instance,
Cisco OCS Perl Script scans Cisco devices on a network by inputting ‘cisco’ into
the password form. ‘cisco’ is the default password for Cisco routers. Metasploit,
a popular penetration testing software tool, includes multiple modules used for
network default password scanning. “For instance, the Ektron CMS400.NET
Password Scanner module searches for Ektron CMS installations within a net-
work that are using default passwords set up by the vendor”.
On the other hand, several worms exist that use default passwords to prop-
agate. According to [32], the ‘Voyager Alpha Force’ worm was used to demon-
strate a vulnerability on Microsoft’s SQL Server with an administrator blank
password using the default port: 1433. Similarly, MySQL required no password
at the time of installation. A worm named “MySpooler” infected 8000 hosts at
a rate of 100 hosts per hour [24]. In 2005, an anonymous developer disclosed a
proof-of-concept worm that targeted Oracle databases using default usernames
and passwords [44]. A particularly malicious worm implementation uses blending
viruses; which are viruses that run a daily Internet scan for vulnerabilities. One
of the main functions of them are to find well known default passwords [14].
[34] triggered malnets; a combination of malware and bots initiated malware
attacks on routers. Their results demonstrated the little effort required to infect
wireless routers using authentication since 25-50% of the users failed to change
their default passwords. A similar experiment was also performed by [45]. Re-
garding wireless malware propagation: 16.7% of routers were set to be configured
with default settings. Only 10% of these routers used default passwords or did
not have passwords set. The work succeeded in modifying the router firmware.
Even health care applications are vulnerable because of default passwords.
They too deal with a plethora of security challenges. [30] suggested conducting
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regular password audits to evaluate the effectiveness of the health care applica-
tion security.
The issue of default password management is a repeat offender in system
security. There has been a variety of experiments, assumptions, and speculations
so as to why users are so reluctant to change these passwords.
2.4 Other devices
Embedded Devices comprise of routers, scanners, printers or IoT devices. An
experiment in which a default credential scanner was created using default root
credentials for a specific device model [9]. The results of the scanner are as
follows:
1. Over 540,000 publicly accessible embedded devices are configured with fac-
tory default root passwords. This constitutes over 13% of all discovered em-
bedded devices.
2. 96.75% of accessible vulnerable devices turned out to be still vulnerable.
3. Later the researchers decided to re-test using the same procedure. They
found that only 3.25% default credentials had been removed or changed.
It was not programmed to engage in any form of brute force password guessing
attacks. Similarly, another study illustrated that out of one million embedded
devices fingerprinted 34.2% ran Microsoft IIS and 33.6% ran Apache. In this
pool of devices: 2% of the embedded devices, running both IIS and Apache,
used default passwords [26].
Higher numbers were discovered by Tripwire; a major cyber threat detec-
tion company. They consulted 653 IT or security professionals. Additionally,
they consulted 1009 remote workers. All individuals were from either the United
States or United Kingdom. Their reports indicate that 30% of IT professionals
and 46% of workers fail to change the default password on their wireless routers.
Furthermore, 55% and 85% fail to change the default IP address on their routers.
This creates opportunities for cross-site request forgery attacks [28]. Expectantly,
average users often fail to acknowledge this issue. However, even IT professionals
and administrators fail to change these passwords after installation; they become
victims as well.
2.5 Databases
Databases have default accounts embedded in them which are prone to vulner-
abilities. [3] argues that there are few databases that feature account lockout
mechanisms and their authentication process is seldom monitored. Big compa-
nies products such as Microsoft SQL and Oracle 9iA are also vulnerable to be
attacked by web servers through unaltered default settings [1]. Consequently,
the question arises: How many of these database management systems (DBMS)
use default configurations? There is a lack of research that seeks to quantify this
issue.
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3 Problem Description
The widespread use of default usernames and passwords represents a significant
threat to both companies and consumers. While security breaches represent a
threat to company integrity and their products, they also represent a threat to
consumers whose data is stolen. Many default passwords are readily available
online and can potentially be used for security breaches. To analyze the impact
of default passwords we examined database management systems, Web server
applications, and content management systems. This lead to some important
questions:
1. How many of these application types utilized default or weak credentials?
2. Next, why do developers permit the use of default credentials?
3. In sum, how can we mitigate security threats from credential negligence?
4 Applications analysis
In choosing applications to test, we decided to focus on web applications as
they are easily accessible and cater to a broad audience. More precisely, we in-
vestigated Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS), Web Server
Applications (WSA), and Content Management Systems (CMS). Applications
were chosen from a list based on popularity, accessibility, cost, and market share
[11]. Applications were taken primarily from the most popular, though several
average use applications were also tested. Some formerly popular and now dep-
recated applications were also tested. Of particular note are: Microsoft Access,
Oracle RDBMS, PostgreSQL, MySQL, and SQLite as some of the most common
applications for DBMS. Microsoft Office is used by 1.2 billion people worldwide
[21], and any security failures in their product could affect enormous numbers
of users. Microsoft, IBM, and Oracle collectively hold approximately 89% of the
DBMS market of 750,000 customers, with Oracle holding around 41.6% (310,000
customers) alone [29].The sheer number of users and the potential compromising
information contained in RDBMS, CMS, and WSA software led to the neces-
sity of testing these top applications. Using the aforementioned list containing
the major applications in all three categories, our methodology for testing is as
follows:
1. For each identified application, search for documentation and identify the
default credentials / settings.
2. Download and install a free or evaluation version of each application. Prior-
itize installation on Windows 10 (64-bit), then Ubuntu Linux 16.04.2, and
finally Mac OS Sierra 10.12.5. Use default configurations and procedure; do
not use advanced or customized installation options.
3. If a default database is not created during installation, create one immedi-
ately after installation.
4. Note any prompts, or lack thereof, regarding security policy enforcement.
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5. Assign each conclusive application a password policy quality value on a scale
of 0 to 4. This was loosely based on an IBM’s classification [41]:
We used Oracle VM VirtualBox 5.1 to create disposable virtual machine
environments for testing.
4.1 Results
In total, n = 90 applications were analyzed where 62 applications yielded con-
clusive results and 281 had inconclusive results due to licensing restrictions. An
overview of the results is given in Tables 1 and 2. Of the 62 conclusive appli-
cations, 41 applications had commercial licenses and 21 were open source. To
analyze the applications, 51 applications were installed on Windows 10 (64-bit),
8 were installed on Linux-x86, four were web services, and one was installed on
Mac OS. Note, two applications were a pre-release version (0.1 - 0.9/Alpha/-
Beta), the remaining 60 applications were a release version (1.0+) (97%).
Default passwords. In total, 30 applications featured a default user name, the
most frequent were “Admin” or “root”. 6 (10%) applications featured a default
password. 32 (52%) applications featured a default blank password for the default
user account. All applications featuring a default password also featured a default
user name.
Password policy quality. Lastly, we analyzed the quality of the passwords
according the IBM classification [41] which is divided into:
Level 0 - No password policy.
Level 1 - Weakest password policy; only requires a single character.
Level 2 - Requires a minimum number of characters but can be compromised
without the aid of a computer.
Level 3 - Requires a minimum number of characters but can still likely be com-
promised with the aid of a computer.
Level 4 - Requires a minimum number of characters, numbers, and special char-
acters, and would be difficult, but not impossible, to compromise; even with
the aid of a computer.
Overall, 36 (58%) applications were categorized as having a level 0 policy, 22
(35%) applications were categorized as having a level 1 policy. Two applications
were categorized as having a level 2 policy. One application was categorized as
having a level 3 policy. Finally, only one application that met the requirements
for a level 4 policy, which is interesting as this is what most modern online
portals require.
1 Actian Ingres, Actian Vector, CA Datacom, CA IDMS, Clarion, Clustrix, Empress
Embedded Database, EXASolution, eXtremeDB, GroveSite, IBM PureSystems, In-
fobright, Linter, Microsoft Visual FoxPro, NexusDB V4 Windows, NonStop SQL,
Openbase, Postgres Plus Advanced Server, R:Base, SAP ADS, SAP Anywhere, SAP
HANA, SAP Sybase ASE, SAP Sybase IQ, SQL Azure, SQream DB, UniData, Ver-
tica
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Summary. There are applications found in our study that feature both default
account names and passwords for the application administrator account. Most of
the applications administrator’s account user names had default values of “root”
and “admin”. Alternatively, applications often used the application name in the
default credentials. Several RDBMS applications use identical values for both
the user name and password.
5 Qualitative survey of default credential use
This section tries to understand why default user credentials / passwords are
still so widely used. Therefore, we acquired IRB2 approval and asked software
developers, computer engineers, and security experts for insight:
Why do many applications still come with a default user name password
and do not require the user to set new credentials according to a reliable
password policy?
The question was distributed online in 20 software developer forums, ad-
vertised to 30 groups on Quora, and other forums. The question was also sent
directly to 35 users on Quora who are known developers. Besides the online dis-
tribution, we sent it to 10 professors from the University of New Haven and the
University of Bridgeport.
Summary of findings. The question received high exposure; in one instance
over 2,800 individuals accessed or viewed the question on Quora. However, the
response rate was low. In total, we only received 20 responses. The answers can
be summarized as follows:
– 6 users blamed the developers for writing a sloppy code.
– A Web Development project manager on Quora described a situation: “I ran
across a custom WordPress / Yii app that used the same password by default.
As the dev manager, I pointed out that this was a major flaw. Got told that
it was but wasn’t urgent. Until a hack happened. By then I’d redesigned the
password system with all sorts of goodies that included rate limits on attempts,
no password access, even for admins, and all sorts of other stuff”.
– The CEO of mid-size online company on LinkedIn explained a situation where
a default password is used: “I need to install my Lazarus application on 20
clients. Can you imaging running through the setup process with password
policies right from the start? Do you see how much more time you’ll need to
spend? ... I imagine you know the hassle of dealing with OS permissions, DB
permissions (different user), application permissions, and then user roles. Yes,
it is possible to have a security policy in place from the start, but do you see
how much more difficult it gets?”
2 We obtained a category two exemption from the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at the University of New Haven restricting the survey from recording participant
identification information or behavior, and disclaiming that it posed risk or harm to
subjects not encountered in everyday life.
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The sample size was not substantial and therefore we cannot claim it is
representative of the whole. However, it did yield some direction, however minor,
that will be considered for discussion or used in resulting studies.
6 Discussion
Default user credentials. While many web portals already enforce strong
password policies, some applications are still lacking; default user credentials are
still prevalent. While several individuals blamed developers for writing ”sloppy”
code, we believe these are design decisions were purposefully made in favor of
other more pressing features. Alternatively, developers may not want to affect
the status quo. Default credentials have been a staple configuration policy for
decades, so why change it? Lastly, developers may simply not be aware of the
importance of security policies; a dangerous mix of when it comes to widespread
product use. Our findings are not new. Documentation for default passwords
is readily available online for a variety of applications; many of which beyond
the scope of this article. Attackers use that knowledge and feed default user
credential password dictionaries to their password cracking tools. For instance,
Hydra or Jack the Ripper usually come with default dictionaries which contain
frequently used credentials
On the other hand, applications are designed to provide the best user expe-
rience to their customers and reduce setup time. Streamlining the installation
process contributes to this effort. It is faster than typing even a documented de-
fault password or generating one for each instance of the application; especially
when the administrator needs to install the application on multiple devices in
succession. The default passwords in this study demonstrate this by being easy
to remember and utilize for multiple devices. For instance, most of applications
used ‘password’, ‘admin’, ‘dba’ etc as default passwords. In addition, after in-
stallation it is far easier for a system administrator to access software using a
default password as they need not remember the specific credentials assigned to
the application.
Weak Passwords. Many of these applications accepted a single character as
a valid user name or password. A user may choose a more complex password,
but because there is often no requirement for special characters or total char-
acter count, the user may choose the easiest, most convenient credential so-
lution. While easy, this solution is often the least secure. That attackers use
that knowledge is frequently demonstrated in the media. For instance, a recent
breach suffered by Ashley Madison in July 2015 compromised customer infor-
mation. The breach affected 30 million users and exposed 60 GB of data. The
website failed to integrate a substantial password policy. A group named Cyno-
sure Prime posted passwords for 11.7 million users after the breach and the
most common passwords used were “123456”,“12345” and “DEFAULT” [8]. A
study by the Hamilton Institute concurred with this and found additional com-
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mon passwords, “password”, “iloveyou”, “princess”, and “rockyou” [19]. These
simple, low-entropy passwords represent a significant threat to their users.
Users. The user remains a significant threat to their own security. Applications
sometimes include a password strength indicator. This shows the user how weak
or strong their chosen password input is before committing to it. However, it
is still up to the user, not a dedicated password policy, to ultimately select a
password of appropriate strength, as low strength passwords are often accepted.
Average users may not prioritize cyber security concerns. These users may
not feel it is necessary to secure their software because they do not use it to
store sensitive information, are not aware of necessary diligence, or do not care.
All of the examined applications provide a means to change user credentials.
Therefore, the user should appreciate the need to have a secure password that is
changed often or begin investing in alternative, non-string password solutions. In
this case the application may not be to blame the user for a compromising event
because it assists with and provides advisory statements with regards to post-
installation credential management that were not properly utilized by the user.
However, the user can also blame the application for not enforcing a substantial
password policy. Displacement of security due diligence is an increasing concern.
Yes, the consumer should have the freedom to choose, but at what point is the
developer doing the consumer a disservice?
At what point does the user take responsibility for their security? To what de-
gree is the application developer responsible for forcing users to be more secure?
As of now it appears that neither the producer nor consumer have considered
due diligence regarding the matter. The default password dilemma devolves into
a self-fulfilling prophecy. If developers continue to forgo proper password poli-
cies then that is what will continue to be expected by users. Users will then
not utilize more secure measures, as they will have become accustomed to poor
security credential management. This in turn will prevent application developers
increasing security measures.
6.1 Possible Solutions
Password policies, as we know them today, are not substantial enough to with-
stand targeted attacks. Instead, we propose a series of solutions that would
greatly reduce risk at very little cost to the administrator.
Ideally, universally enforcing password policies, no matter the medium, would
encourage users to be more security minded from the start. Additionally, educa-
tion/training may assist in reforming this poisonous culture. Training may come
from within in order to create a better product or be government incentivized via
standard requirements. Especially within software applications, password poli-
cies need to become the rule; not the exception. This could be achieved with
either legal or commercial standardization practices. We offer some solutions
and alternatives to mitigate the potential for default and weak password abuse:
– Applications should require the user to set up customized credentials upon
installation. Better yet the application itself should not be allowed to function
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properly without these customized credentials. During the choice of the pass-
word, a password policy should be enforced, or at least a password strength
indicator should be shown. This standard can be enforced by not allowing the
user to proceed until they meet a certain string password strength require-
ment.
– Applications could become smart and warn the administrator when it goes
live that default user credentials are still in place. This policy could be per-
petuated using different, use appropriate licensing. Alternatively, the software
may have two separate functioning modes; one production, one live. Toggling
from production to live may prompt this check.
– Advances in security technology have lead to widespread use of dual layer
authentication. Dual layer, also called two-factor or two-step authentication,
requires the user to have two separate means of authentication in order to
access a service. Gmail, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, PayPal, Dropbox, Steam,
and many more applications already employ this security policy. If dual layer
authentication is not included in the current product then it should be as most
people have an email address or mobile number.
We acknowledge that mandatory policy standards would be more difficult
to integrate as it would require widespread acceptance and support. However,
there is incentive for both for-profit and non-profit parties:
For-profit solutions involve creating marketing opportunities to outperform
the competition in the security sector. However, we also suggest that developers
use an enhanced credential feature set to their advantage by marketing it as
prestigious. For example, a seal of approval on each product identifying the
lengths at which the developers went to assure security due diligence. Intel and
Windows both often label laptops from various brands to promote their product.
Energy saving labels are prominently displayed to demonstrate a product’s cost
savings. Why not utilize a “Security Certified” label as well? This way, we appeal
to business sensibilities; many developers are inevitably interested in financial
growth. Businesses may begin to clamber to market their own products as more
secure than their competitors; we need to make security sexy.
Non-profit, or government funded solutions, create opportunities for control
over security standards. Worst case, commercial entities that do not meet these
standards may lack the endorsement to sell product until they meet certain
requirements; in much the same way as Volkswagen needed to reevaluate their
emission standards or the Environmental Protection Agency requires businesses
to dispose of hazardous waste in an appropriate manner.
Going forward, developers should consider foregoing string passwords as we
know them today in favor of biometric solutions. Fingerprint scanners are already
featured on many mobile devices. Retinal scanners are also a less mainstream
possibility that may trump insecure facial recognition techniques.
Marrying both ideas, dual layer authentication could also incorporate keystroke
dynamics or an accelerometer. That is, either exclusively using a string password
or in conjunction with a biometric password, also measuring the integrity of the
user’s attempt. For example, the password may be correct, but the user’s haptic
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interaction must also be conclusive according to the stored baseline that was
measured during credential configuration.
Lastly, there are opportunities in default passwords in other security applica-
tions; to deceive potential attackers by using a ‘honeypot’ mechanism. The actual
application data should be protected by a secure password policy solution. How-
ever, purposely leaving a separate, vulnerable application without a responsible
password policy may allow administrators to detect and catch potential threats.
6.2 Developers and Default Credentials
We have demonstrated the prevalence of default password use but need to revisit
the question “Why are developers still using default passwords?”. We have to
acknowledge both the user and developer sides of the argument. Our brief survey
can be summarized as follows:
– Users blame developers for writing sloppy code. This could be expanded into
a discussion about developer blaming concerning a lack of due diligence.
– Developers may not prioritize a credential security feature set over other press-
ing issues. One developer acknowledged the security flaw but it was not an
urgent enough feature set to prioritize. Developers may also feel as though
security due diligence should be the responsibility of the user.
– Lastly, adhering to a more substantial credential policy is inconvenient. With
regards to the security triangle, confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility, the
more secure a policy, the less accessible it becomes. When a system adminis-
trator is configuring twenty different installations they may not want to bother
with a more substantial policy to save time.
The survey results can be further summarized. Both the users and devel-
opers seem interested in displacing the responsibility of security due diligence.
Users are also interested in minimizing effort, especially in larger installations
or management, in order to make their responsibilities more accessible in the
future.
7 Limitations
There are some notable limitations in this study: First, a large portion of the
applications found were inaccessible for downloading and installing because they
were not open-source, expensive, or came with demo or trial versions that did
not contain login information required for this research. Therefore, it was often
necessary to use documentation for information on default settings. Additionally,
we could not follow the same installation procedure for all applications as all are
installed differently. Secondly, we received a statistically insignificant number of
survey responses. While the responses we received encourage further discussion,
they are not suitable for drawing conclusions. Future research should focus, in
part, on finding a more reliable means of surveying professionals. Lastly, all tests
were done manually and therefore prone to human errors.
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8 Conclusion
This article surveyed a well-known default password issue on 21 open-sourced
applications and 41 commercial applications. Out of the 62 applications, we
found that 32 applications featured a default user name, 6 applications featured
a default password and 32 applications accepted empty passwords. In total, 38
applications surveyed can lead an administrator using default user credentials.
Meanwhile, in order to evaluate the password policy we also scored the appli-
cations with IBM password quality scale. 36 of applications scored with ‘0’,
having no password policy. 22 of applications scored a ‘1’, meaning that a single
character password is acceptable, the weakest possible password policy. Only 4
applications had an acceptable password policy. To explain why practitioners
may keep default user credentials of the DBMS on their own database system,
we distributed a survey on Quora and responded by variety roles such as web
developer, system manager, CEO etc (Sec. 5). Precisely, the reasons could be de-
veloper’s negligence, complexity of the setup, lack of management etc. Besides,
we further discussed the reasons in depth and put forward some solutions in
accordance with the default-password issues.
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Table 1. Surveyed Applications
Name Version/
Release
Platform Commercial/
Open-Source
License Default User-
name
Default
Password
Password
Policy
Quality
4th Dimension 16.1 Windows Commercial 30-Day
Evaluation
“Administrator” None 0
Adabas 2016 April Windows Commercial Community
Edition
Inherits user ac-
count.
Inherits
user pass-
word.
0
Alpha Five V12 Windows Commercial 30-Day
Evaluation
“Admin” None 0
Altibase 6.5 Linux-x86 Commercial Community
Edition
None None 0
Amazon Aurora N/A Web-
Service
Commercial N/A None None 2
Apache Derby 10.13.1.1 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 0
Apache
OpenOffice.org
Base
4.1.3 Windows Open-Source N/A N/A N/A 0
Apache Trafo-
dion
2.1.0 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 12
Base X 8.6 Windows Open-Source Free Version ”admin” ”admin” 0
ClickHouse 1.1.54189 Linux-x86 Open-Source N/A None None 0
CSQL 3.3 Linux-x86 Open-Source N/A None None 0
CUBRID 10.0.0.1376 Windows Open-Source N/A “admin” “admin” 23
Database Man-
agement Library
(C++)
1.0 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 0
DataEase 6.5 Demo Windows Commercial N/A “labadmin” None 0
Dataphor 3.1.6143 Windows Open-Source N/A “admin” None 0
dBase PLUS 11.2 Windows Commercial 30-Day
Evaluation
None None 0
Drupal 8.3.2 Windows Commercial Free Version None None 1
EnterpriseDB 9.6 Windows Commercial Standard
Version
“postgresql” None 1
FileMaker Pro 15 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“Admin” None 0
Firebird 3.0.2 Windows Open-Source N/A N/A N/A 1
FrontBase 8.28 Windows Commercial Free Version None None 0
Google Fusion
Tables
N/A Web Service Commercial Free Version Google Account Google Ac-
count
34
Greenplum 5.0.0-
alpha.3
Linux-x86 Open-Source N/A None None 0
H2 1.4.195 Windows Open-Source N/A “sa” None 0
Helix 7.0.2 Mac OS Commercial Demo Ver-
sion
None None 0
HSQL 2.4.0 Windows Open-Source N/A “SA” None 0
IBM DB2 11.1 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“db2admin” None 1
IBM DB2
Express-C
11.1 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“db2admin” None 1
Informix Enter-
prise
12.10 Windows Commercial Time-
Limited
“informix”,
“ifxjson”
None 0
InterBase 2017 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“SYSDBA” N/A 1
0: No password policy.
1: Password policy only requires a single character.
2: Requires a minimum number of characters but can be compromised without a computer.
3: Requires a minimum number of characters but can still likely be compromised with a computer.
4: Requires a minimum number of characters, numbers, and special characters, and would be difficult to compromise.
1: Fully custom credentials required.
2: Forces custom credentials following login with defaults.
3: Two-factor authentication required.
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Table 2. Surveyed Applications (Continued)
Name Version/
Release
Platform Commercial/
Open-Source
License Default User-
name
Default
Password
Password
Policy
Quality
InterSystems
CachA˜©
2017.1 Windows Commercial Evaluation
Version
“ SYSTEM”,
“Admin”,
“SuperUser”,
“forensics”,
“CSPSystem”
N/A 12
JBoss Web Con-
sole
6 Windows Commercial Free Version “Admin” “Admin” 0
Joomla 3.7 Windows Commercial Free Version “admin” None 1
LibreOffice Base 5.3.3 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 0
MariaDB 10.3 Windows Open-Source Free Version “root” N/A 1
Microsoft Ac-
cess
16.0 Windows Commercial Office 2016 None None 0
Microsoft SQL
Server
2016 SP1 Windows Commercial Express
Edition
“sa” None 0
Mimer SQL 10.1 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“SYSADM” N/A 1
MonetDB 11.25.21 Windows Open-Source Free Version None None 0
mSQL Linux-x86 Commercial Free Version “root” None 0
MySQL 5.7.18.1 Windows Commercial Community
Edition
“root” None 0
neo4j 3.2 Windows Commercial Evaluation “neo4j” None 11
NexusDB V4 Windows Commercial Server Trial
Version
N/A N/A 1
NuoDB
Database
2.6.1 Windows Commercial Community
Edition
“dba” “goalie” 11
NuoDB Domain Web Service Commercial Community
Edition
None None 1
OpenLink Vir-
tuoso
6.0 Windows Commerical Trial Ver-
sion
N/A N/A 1
Oracle RDBMS 7.3 Windows Commerical Free Version N/A N/A 0
Oracle
TimesTen
Windows Commercial Free Version N/A N/A 12
Orange HRM 3.3.1 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 12
Polyhedra 8.6.1 Windows Commercial Lite Version None None 0
PostgreSQL 9.6 Windows Open-Source N/A ”postgres” None 0
RDM Server 8.4 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
N/A N/A 12
SAND CDBMS 8.1 Windows Commercial Free Version “DBA” None 0
SAP MaxDB 7.8.02.39 Windows Commercial Free “DBADMIN” N/A 1
ScimoreDB 4.0 Windows Commercial Freeware None None 0
SQLBase 12.0 Windows Commercial Trial Ver-
sion
“SERVER1” “SECRET” 0
SQLite 3.18 Windows Open-Source N/A None None 0
Tableau (Local) 10.2.2 64-
bit
Windows Commercial 14-Day
Evaluation
N/A N/A 0
Tableau (On-
line)
10.2.2 64-
bit
Windows Commercial 14-Day
Evaluation
N/A N/A 4
Tibero 6.0 Windows Commercial 30-Day
Evaluation
“root”, “sys”,
“syscat”, “sys-
gis”, “outln”,
“tibero”,
“tibero1”
“tibero”,
“tibero”,
“syscat”,
“sysgis”,
“outln”,
“tmax”,
“tmax”
1
txtSQL 3.0.0b Windows Open-Source N/A “root” None 0
Wordpress 4.7.4 Web Service Open-Source N/A None None 1
0: No password policy.
1: Password policy only requires a single character.
2: Requires a minimum number of characters but can be compromised without a computer.
3: Requires a minimum number of characters but can still likely be compromised with a computer.
4: Requires a minimum number of characters, numbers, and special characters, and would be difficult to compromise.
1: Fully custom credentials required.
2: Forces custom credentials following login with defaults.
3: Two-factor authentication required.
